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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Michael Malik Allah appeals the District Court's order 
dismissing Allah's complaint before service on the ground 
that his claims are barred by the Supreme Court's decision 
in Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The appeal 
requires us to consider the effect of the Sandin  decision on 
Allah's access-to-courts claims, including his claim that he 
was kept in administrative segregation in retaliation for 




Allah, who was granted leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis, filed his pro se complaint on September 19, 1997 
alleging that he was being kept in administrative 
segregation at S.C.I. Greene in retaliation forfiling civil 
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rights lawsuits against prison officials at S.C.I. Frackville 
and S.C.I. Graterford, two prisons where he had earlier 
been housed, and that while he was kept in administrative 
segregation he was denied meaningful access to the courts. 
 
According to his complaint, Allah was transferred from 
S.C.I. Frackville to S.C.I. Greene on July 9, 1997 and was 
placed in administrative segregation. He was told by the 
officer in charge that the officer "had not had a chance to 
review [his] records" but that Allah would be brought before 
the Program Review Committee ("PRC") the next day, July 
10. App. at 10. Allah was brought before the PRC on July 
15 and was told that the PRC still did not have his records 
but that he would be seen every 30 days. Allah alleges the 
PRC did have his records but kept him in administrative 
segregation in retaliation for filing lawsuits when he was 
housed at other prisons. He was again brought before the 
PRC on August 12, 1998 and denied release to the general 
population, with "[n]o valid reason given." App. at 11. On 
September 9, 1997, he was again brought before the PRC 
and denied release to the general population. 
 
Allah alleges in his complaint that he is "unable to file 
and product [sic] briefs" in his criminal case and unable to 
conduct discovery in his civil rights cases while in 
administrative segregation at S.C.I. Greene. App. at 10. His 
complaint seeks relief in the form of compensation damages 
and punitive damages. In his briefs he asserts that he also 
seeks injunctive and declaratory relief. 
 
On September 29, 1997, before service of the complaint, 
the Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim, stating: 
 
       In Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995), the Court 
       held that housing an inmate in disciplinary custody did 
       not impose such atypical and significant hardships on 
       the inmate so as to invoke Constitutional protection. 
       Thus, the plaintiff 's complaint here is without merit 
       . . . 
 
Report and Recommendation, Doc. # 6 (Sept. 29, 1997) at 
2. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report 
and Recommendation as the opinion of the court and 
ordered the complaint dismissed. Allah timely appealed. 
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This court appointed counsel to represent Allah on appeal.1 
We also requested that the Commonwealth submit a brief 
and argue as amicus curiae.2 The appeal was consolidated 
with another brought by Allah in a separate case captioned 
Allah v. Al-Hafeez, No. 98-1385. The two consolidated 
appeals present distinct legal issues, and we address the 
issues in separate opinions. 
 
Our review of the District Court's sua sponte dismissal 
for failure to state a claim, which was authorized by 28 
U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c)(2), like 
that for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is plenary. 
See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 
1999). "[W]e must accept as true the factual allegations in 
the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be 





Allah alleges two claims in his complaint: that he was 
denied meaningful access to the courts while he was kept 
in administrative segregation and that he was kept in 
administrative segregation in retaliation for filing civil rights 
claims against prison officials at S.C.I. Frackville and S.C.I. 
Graterford. The District Court interpreted Sandin to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We expressed our appreciation to this firm and others in note 4 of the 
companion opinion in Allah v. Al-Hafeez, No. 98-1385. 
 
2. A motions panel of this court requested that the parties address 
several additional issues in their briefs, including, inter alia, whether 
any 
or all of Allah's claims are moot, whether Allah has exhausted available 
administrative remedies in accordance with 42 U.S.C.S 1997e(a), 
whether Allah's claims seeking monetary damages are barred by 42 
U.S.C. S 1997e(e), and what standard should be applied to a claim 
alleging retaliation for exercising the right to petition the courts. For 
the 
most part, those issues are not directly presented by this appeal, and we 
accordingly do not decide them here. As for mootness, a jurisdictional 
issue, it is clear, and the parties do not dispute, that at least Allah's 
claims for damages survive his release from administrative segregation. 
See Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 n.13 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that 
prisoner's transfer from the prison moots claim for injunctive and 
declaratory relief with respect to prison conditions but not claim for 
damages). 
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preclude both of these claims, apparently in the belief that 
Sandin stands for the principle that no claim arising out of 
administrative segregation can form the basis for a 
constitutional violation. We cannot agree with that 
interpretation of Sandin. 
 
Sandin involved a S 1983 suit brought by a state prisoner 
against several prison officials alleging that they had 
violated his constitutional right to procedural due process 
by sentencing him to disciplinary segregation without 
permitting him to call certain witnesses. See  515 U.S. at 
476. The Supreme Court noted in Sandin that under the 
procedure previously followed, if the Due Process Clause 
itself did not confer a liberty interest in a particular prison 
situation,3 the federal courts would proceed to "examin[e] 
. . . the possibility that the State had created a liberty 
interest by virtue of its prison regulations. . . ." Id. at 480 
(explaining the approach taken by the Court in Hewitt v. 
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). The Supreme Court 
substantially modified that analysis in Sandin , holding that 
an examination of a state statute or regulation should not 
be conducted unless the challenged restraint on freedom 
"imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484. 
As the Court explained: 
 
       States may under certain circumstances create liberty 
       interests which are protected by the Due Process 
       Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to 
       freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the 
       sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise 
       to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own 
       force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant 
       hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
       incidents of prison life. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Court has held that the Due Process Clause confers a liberty 
interest in certain situations. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210 (1990) (holding that an inmate has a liberty interest in being 
protected from the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs); 
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (holding that an inmate has a liberty 
interest in being free from involuntary transfer to mental hospital for 
treatment). 
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Id. at 483-84 (citations omitted). Applying this approach to 
the facts of the case before it, the Court held that"[the 
prisoner's] discipline in segregated confinement did not 
present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which 
a State might conceivably create a liberty interest," 
inasmuch as "[t]he regime to which [the prisoner] was 
subjected . . . was within the range of confinement to be 
normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of 
30 years to life." Id. at 486-87. 
 
The Court's opinion makes clear that the decision does 
not foreclose other claims challenging the constitutionality 
of official actions. Specifically, it states: 
 
       Prisoners . . . , of course, retain other protection from 
       arbitrary state action even within the expected 
       conditions of confinement. They may invoke the First 
       and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection 
       Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where 
       appropriate, and may draw upon internal prison 
       grievance procedures and state judicial review where 
       available. 
 
Id. at 487 n.11. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Allah's claim alleging 
denial of his constitutional right to meaningful access to 
the courts is not foreclosed by Sandin. In fact, the 
Commonwealth concedes as much in its brief, stating that 
the District Court "should have" considered that claim. See 
Amicus Br. at 27. It is well settled that prisoners have a 
constitutional right to access to the courts, which requires 
access to "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance 
from persons trained in the law" for filing challenges to 
criminal sentences, both direct and collateral, and civil 
rights actions. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); 
see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) 
(recognizing that the Constitution requires that prisoners 
be provided the tools "that the inmates need in order to 
attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order 
to challenge the conditions of their confinement"); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (extending right of 
access to the courts, founded on the Due Process Clause, 
to prisoners filing actions under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 to 
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vindicate "basic constitutional rights"). 4 This right to access 
to the courts is distinct from any liberty interest in 
remaining free from administrative or disciplinary 
segregation. A claim founded on the right of access remains 
viable after Sandin.5 
 
Nor does Sandin preclude Allah's claim alleging that he 
was kept in administrative segregation in retaliation for 
filing civil rights suits against prison officials. We have 
recognized that "[t]he right of access to the courts . . . must 
be freely exercisable without hindrance or fear of 
retaliation." Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 
1981) (locating right to access the courts in a retaliation 
case in the First Amendment right to petition for redress of 
grievances); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 
588 n.10 (1998) (stating that "[t]he reason why . . . 
retaliation offends the Constitution is that it threatens to 
inhibit exercise of the protected right"). 
 
Sandin instructs that placement in administrative 
confinement will generally not create a liberty interest. See 
Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(applying Sandin and holding that conditions experienced 
by prisoner in administrative custody did not implicate 
liberty interest). Retaliation may be actionable, however, 
even when the retaliatory action does not involve a liberty 
interest. See, e.g., Stanley v. Litscher , 213 F.3d 340, 343 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The right to access to the courts has a number of constitutional roots, 
including the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. See 
generally Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1036 n.18 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(chronicling sources of the right). 
 
5. At argument, the Commonwealth suggested that Allah's access to 
courts claim should be dismissed for failure to allege actual injury, as 
required by Casey. Under Casey, in order to have standing to challenge 
prison conditions as denying meaningful access to the courts, a prisoner 
must plead facts to "demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings . . . 
hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." 518 U.S. at 351. Allah 
alleges, inter alia, that while he was in administrative segregation he 
did 
not have access to trained legal aids and as a result was unable to file 
a brief in his post-conviction appeal, which he alleges was due on 
September 10, 1997, the day after the date of his complaint. Construing 
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(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff stated claim for 
retaliatory transfer even though no liberty interest involved 
in transfer); Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 
1999) (same). "[G]overnment actions, which standing alone 
do not violate the Constitution, may nonetheless be 
constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a 
desire to punish an individual for exercise of a 
constitutional right." Thaddeus-X v. Blatter , 175 F.3d 378, 
386 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
 
Our holding that claims alleging retaliation for the 
exercise of First Amendment rights survive Sandin is 
consistent with those circuits that have considered the 
issue. In Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806-07 (9th Cir. 
1995), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
Sandin did not bar a claim alleging that a prisoner-plaintiff 
had been transferred and placed in a double cell in 
retaliation for a television interview that he had given. The 
court stated: 
 
       To succeed on his retaliation claim, [the plaintiff] need 
       not establish an independent constitutional interest in 
       either assignment to a given prison or placement in a 
       single cell, because the crux of his claim is that state 
       officials violated his First Amendment rights by 
       retaliating against him for his protected speech 
       activities. 
 
Id. at 806. In Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 274-75 (7th 
Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
agreed, holding that a prisoner-plaintiff 's claim that a 
prison official had prevented an expeditious transfer in 
retaliation for his filing lawsuits against prison officials was 
actionable "even if [the prison official's] actions did not 
independently violate the Constitution" and thus was not 
barred by Sandin. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that "the sense of the Sandin 
opinion" counsels us to hold that continued placement in 
administrative confinement can never amount to adverse 
action sufficient to support a retaliation claim. Amicus Br. 
at 18. As the Supreme Court recognized in its footnote in 
Sandin, however, "[p]risoners . . . retain other protection 
from arbitrary state action even within the expected 
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conditions of confinement." 515 U.S. 487 n.11 (emphasis 
added). 
 
We recently explained this court's position on the adverse 
action prong of a retaliation claim in Suppan v. Dadonna, 
203 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2000). There, we considered whether 
the defendants' action of placing plaintiffs lower on 
promotion ranking lists in retaliation for the exercise of 
their First Amendment free speech rights was sufficiently 
adverse to state a claim for retaliation. We held that it was, 
stating that a fact finder could conclude that"the alleged 
retaliatory conduct was sufficient `to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness' from exercising his First Amendment 
rights." Id. at 235 (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 
625 (7th Cir. 1982)). This same test has been applied in the 
prison context. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396-99; 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(en banc) (approving the Bart standard in the prison 
context), reversed on other grounds, 523 U.S. 574 (1998). 
 
Although it is possible that in some cases placement in 
administrative segregation would not deter a prisoner of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his or her First 
Amendment rights, we cannot say that such action can 
never amount to adverse action. On the contrary, whether 
a prisoner-plaintiff has met that prong of his or her 
retaliation claim will depend on the facts of the particular 
case. 
 
Here, Allah alleges that his confinement in administrative 
segregation resulted, inter alia, in reduced access to phone 
calls, reduced access to the commissary, reduced access to 
recreation, confinement in his cell for all butfive hours per 
week, denial of access to rehabilitative programs and, 
significantly, inadequate access to legal research materials 
and assistance. A fact finder could conclude from those 
facts that retaliatory continued placement in administrative 
confinement would "deter a person of ordinaryfirmness 
from exercising his First Amendment rights." Suppan, 203 
F.3d at 235 (internal quotations omitted); see Thaddeus-X, 
175 F.3d at 396 ("[A]n action comparable to transfer to 
administrative segregation would certainly be adverse."). 
 




For the reasons stated, we will vacate the order of the 
District Court sua sponte dismissing Allah's complaint as 
barred by Sandin and will remand for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
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